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Abstract 
In the absence of formal coping mechanisms in the face of health expenditures, 
households are forced to penalize their resources and to use one or more strategies. 
Those strategies include using own resources, selling assets or borrowing from others 
outside the household. We show that different factors influence how families in 
developing countries cope with health spending. 
Given the data available, the study identifies the relevant factors to recognize 
households in financial distress due to health expenditures. Their fragile position is 
proven to be mainly characterized by the size of the family, educational level, location 
of the household and asset ownership quintile. 
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Section 1. Introduction  
Income and expenditure shocks play a key role in determining welfare in the 
developing world. In many developing countries, people are expected to pay on its own 
the cost of health care. Therefore, their ability to pay for health care has become a 
significant policy issue. “ The money used to pay for health care may otherwise have 
been used for food, agricultural development or education. Payment for health services 
is thus made at considerable social cost to the family and can scarcely be said to 
represent a “willingness” to pay in the normal sense of the word.” (Russell, 1996, p.1) 
From previous literature, common household responses to payment difficulties 
are identified, ranging from borrowing to more serious 'distress sales' of productive 
assets and, eventually, abandonment of treatment.
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In designing their health systems, policy makers need to understand whether 
some characteristics make people more exposed to catastrophic payments.  
In that sense, the aim of this work project is to identify which households are 
more vulnerable and to explore the impact that several factors have on influencing the 
choice of strategies to cope with health expenditures. The strategies adopted include not 
only the use of own resources but also the possibility of selling assets and borrowing 
from others. Factors that may influence the household behavior range from 
socioeconomic characteristics to the percentage of dependent members and asset 
ownership level.  
Families‟ vulnerability was found to be directly related to their size, educational 
level and members in a poor health status. Moreover, households at the lowest quintiles 
                                                          
1
 Mwabuet al. (1995). 
  Abel-Smith et al. (1992). 
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tend to be more expose to use penalizing strategies when facing health expenditures 
than people in the highest quintiles. 
Expenditure is defined as catastrophic if a household‟s financial contributions to 
the health system exceed 40% of income remaining after subsistence needs have been 
met (Xu et al., 2003). High health care costs may not be reflected in catastrophic 
expenditures if the household does not bear the full cost because the service is provided 
free or at a subsidized price, or is covered by private insurance. On the other hand, for 
poor households even small costs can lead to financial disaster. 
Thus, whereas financial protection against events of illness is increasing among 
the insured population, the non-insured do not have such protection and are, therefore, 
at a greater risk of incurring in catastrophic expenditure. If they fall ill, the related 
expenses have to be covered through out-of-pocket payments. The poor have very little 
access to formal insurance. In many surveys, questions about insurance are not even 
asked. When the poor come under economic stress, their form of “insurance” is often 
eating less or taking their children out of school. Ultimately, informal insurance relies 
on the willingness of the fortunate to take care of those less favored. Unfortunately 
governments in these countries are not very effective at providing insurance either. For 
example, in most countries, the government is supposed to provide free health care to 
the poor. Yet, health care is rarely free. (Banerjee and Duflo, 2006) 
Moreover, the impact of coping mechanisms is likely to be country specific. 
This work project will then present a comprehensive analysis of data from various 
countries in order to compare differences in strategies used to finance health care and 
their consequences across countries and populations.  
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Section 1 will introduce the subject and purpose of the study, Section 2 will 
revise past contributions to the area, while Section 3 will enlighten about the 
methodology used. Sections 4 and 5 will determine which factors influence the most the 
probability of using each of the available strategies and the existence of health 
expenditures. Finally, Section 6 will point out the limitations of this study and the 
economic insights of the results. 
 
Section 2. Literature Review 
Health shocks 
The economic consequences of health shocks in developing countries have been 
the focus of increasing attention. Health shocks are defined as unpredictable illnesses 
that diminish health status.  
When faced with a health shock households often incur in catastrophic 
expenditures. A health shock can lead to financial hardship and even impoverishment. 
Many of those who do seek care suffer financial catastrophe and impoverishment as a 
result of meeting these costs, the financial consequences of paying for care (Xu et al., 
2007). The term catastrophic implies that such expenditure levels are „„likely to force 
households to cut their consumption of other minimum needs, trigger productive asset 
sales or high levels of debt, and lead to impoverishment‟‟ (Russell, 2004, p.147).  
The ethical position here is that no one ought to spend more than a given fraction 
of income on health care (Wagstaff et al., 2007). Some authors focused on financial 
catastrophe caused by out-of-pocket payments made directly to a provider for receiving 
services (Xu et al., 2007). 
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In fact, health insurance, either public or private, is exceptional in the majority 
of developing countries and correspondingly, much of the borrowing and saving by 
households is of informal nature. The households are generally characterized by their 
lack of collateral that restraint them to access to credit markets. 
 
Out-of-pocket payments 
Out-of-pocket health payments refer to the payments made by households at the 
point they receive health services. Typically these include doctor‟s consultation fees, 
purchases of medication and hospital bills. It is also important to note that out-of-pocket 
payments are net of any insurance reimbursement (Xu et al., 2005). 
The common practice is the construction of indexes. Either capturing the 
intensity of catastrophe as well as its incidence and also the degree to which 
catastrophic payments occur disproportionately among poor households (Wagstaff  et 
al., 2003) or even whom paid more both in absolute and relative terms (O‟ Donnell  at 
al., 2005). Poverty impact of out-of-pocket payments is primarily due to poor people 
becoming even poorer rather than the non-poor being made poor, and that it was not 
expenses associated with inpatient care that increased poverty but rather non-hospital 
expenditures (Wagstaff et al., 2003). The tendency for the burden of health care 
financing to be less concentrated on the better-off in more developed economies arises, 
in part, from differences in the structure of financing. As an economy grows, reliance on 
out-of-pocket payments for health care falls and social health insurance is typically 
established. The latter tend to be broadly proportional because contributions are levied 
as a fixed percentage of earnings (O‟ Donnell et al., 2005). 
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In absence of formal health insurance, it is argued that the strategies households 
adopt to finance health care have important implications for the measurement and 
interpretation of how health payments impact on consumption and poverty (Flores et al., 
2008). Although most of the variation in catastrophic spending can be explained by the 
triad of poverty, health-service use, and the absence of risk pooling mechanisms, 
important unexplained variation remains (Xu et al., 2003). 
The analysis lead us to think that if out-of-pocket spending could be reduced to 
levels lower than a threshold level of total health spending, few households would be 
affected by catastrophic payments. The cross-country variation, however, often shows 
that other more complex strategies can protect households against catastrophic 
spending, such as progressive fee schedules, highly subsidized or free hospital services, 
and the provision of certain health services to the poor (Xu et al., 2003). Moreover, the 
incidence of financial catastrophe is negatively correlated with the extent to which 
countries fund their health systems using prepayment of some form - taxes or insurance. 
Conversely, catastrophe is positively correlated with the relative importance of out-of-
pocket payments in total health spending (Xu et al., 2007). 
Coping with health expenditures 
In addition, coping mechanisms provide important information on how 
households respond to health shocks and how payment may affect their future welfare. 
Financial coping strategies refer to actions intended to protect current consumption from 
an economic shock, such as that induced by illness (Morduch et al., 1995). The most 
immediate response to financial costs of illness is to use savings. The impact is often on 
reducing consumption, most often of food. Another strategy is to sell assets, such as 
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land or livestock in a rural setting, often increasing a vicious cycle of increased 
economic vulnerability. The most common response is, however, borrowing, from 
family and friends, highlighting the importance of social networks, or from a money-
lender. Other strategies for dealing with the direct costs of illness include diversifying 
income by engaging in activities other than their normal work or households selling 
their labor (Sauerborn et al., 1996). The response to health shocks is extremely 
influenced by household relationships‟ structure and between the household and their 
social networks. Social connections end up playing an important role in the availability 
of loans and in the respective settlement of interest rates.  
In fact, using income and savings, borrowing or selling assets are driven by 
different motivations and in that sense treated as separate strategies as opposed to out-
of-pocket payments described in the studies mentioned above. Further in this analysis 
are not only presented the factors that influence coping mechanisms but also the ones 
that influence having health expenditures, when there is no protection towards an health 
shock. 
 
Section 3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Characterization of the Sample 
The sample is composed by 13 African countries classified by the World Bank 
as low-income countries, except for Congo, Côte d‟Ivoire, Senegal and Swaziland, 
which are classified as low-middle income countries. The countries are geographically 
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spread throughout the western, central, eastern and southern parts of sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
These countries differ in their levels of income, life expectancy and total health 
expenditure. In 2002, the GDP per capita varies a lot between the countries in the 
sample, being the lowest value attributable to Ethiopia (US$ 113) and the highest to 
Zimbabwe (US$ 1749). The life expectancy ranges from 41 years in Zimbabwe to 57 in 
Ghana. Total expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP was less than 6% except in 
Chad, Ghana, Malawi and Zimbabwe. 
Table 1. Gross Domestic Product per capita, Life expectancy and Total expenditure on 
health as proportion of GDP:  
 
In 2009, the lowest GDP per capita is now attributed to Malawi (US$ 326) and 
the highest to Swaziland (US$ 2478) being Ethiopia the country with the highest growth 
of GDP per capita during this period and Malawi with the lowest. The data available for 
2002 2009 2002 2008 2002 2008
Burkina Faso 264 517 51 53 5 5,6
Chad 220 596 49 49 6,3 4,9
Congo 950 2361 53 54 3,7 1,8
Côte d'Ivoire 636 1093 55 57 2,4 4,2
Ethiopia 113 345 52 55 4,7 3,4
Ghana 301 655 57 57 6,5 7,8
Kenya 397 759 52 54 4,5 4,5
Malawi 212 326 50 50 10 9,7
Mali 304 691 46 46 5,7 5,5
Mauritania 418 921 56 53 3,2 2,6
Senegal 511 1042 54 48 5,1 5,7
Swaziland 1066 2478 47 57 5,9 5,9
Zimbabwe 1749 NA 41 44 8,1 NA
So urce : Wo rld Bank and Natio nal Health Acco unts  o f Wo rld Health Organiza tio n, 2002.
Country
GDP per capita 
(current US$)
Life expectancy 
at birth, total 
(years)
Total expenditure 
on health as %  of 
GDP
NA - No t ava ilable
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these countries on life expectancy and total expenditure in health as a percentage of 
GDP is from 2008; their relative and absolute position did not change significantly.  
The health systems of these countries are generally characterized by low level of 
revenues coming from the government, low total health spending and few risk-pooling 
mechanisms. Private financing sources are generally firms, NGOs, households or other 
entities (predominantly funding from external resources). 
Total expenditure on health aggregates both public and private spending on 
health. The percentage of the expenditure on health financed by the private sector is 
higher than the percentage financed by public contributions for the majority of the 
countries. Public outlays on health include tax-funded health expenditure, Social 
Security and External Resources. The percentage of total health expenditure that 
External Resources finance ranges from 2% in Zimbabwe to 44.4% in Malawi. External 
Resources are loans and grants for medical care and medical goods channeled through 
the Ministry of Health or other public agencies. Grants to non-governmental 
organizations are accounted for as private expenditure but, in practice, they are not 
always easily separated from public grants. 
Social Security on Health is the premiums paid by employees and employers for 
compulsory schemes of medical care and medical goods for a sizeable group of 
population, which have no contribution almost in all countries, being Kenya and 
Senegal the exceptions. 
Private outlays integrate health insurance  and prepaid schemes, mandated 
enterprise health expenditure, expenditure on health through non-profit health services  
and direct payments or out-of-pocket expenditure in health goods  which include co-
payment as well as direct disbursements by uninsured individuals. Out-of-pocket 
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spending is direct payments of households for goods and services whose primary intent 
is to contribute to the restoration or to the enhancement of their health status. These 
include the payments made to public services, non-profit institutions or non-
governmental organizations by households. 
As a share of private health expenditure, out-of-pocket payments range from less 
than 41.1% in Swaziland to about 100% in Cote d‟Ivoire and Mauritania, with an 
average of about 80% for the 13 countries. Some of the countries, such as Burkina Faso, 
Ghana and Senegal, have community health insurance, mostly working through 
microfinance initiatives, since social health insurance why exists in a small number of 
African countries. 
Table 2. National Health Accounts 2002.
 
 
 
 
Country General government 
expenditure on health 
(GGHE) as %  of THE
Private 
expenditure on 
health (PvtHE) 
as %  of THE
External resources 
on health as %  of 
total health 
expenditure
GGHE as %  
of General 
government 
expenditure
Social 
security 
funds as 
%  of 
GGHE
Private 
insuranc
e as %  of 
PvtHE
Out of pocket 
expenditure 
as %  of 
PvtHE
Burkina Faso 43,9 56,1 14,5 11,2 0,8 1 94,3
Chad 45,4 54,6 18,2 13,8 0 0,4 96,2
Congo 27,8 72,2 7,4 5,2 0 12,2 87,8
Côte d'Ivoire 52,7 47,3 4,5 3,6 0 0 100
Ethiopia 54 46 10,4 10,2 0 1 81,3
Ghana 36,2 63,8 15,8 9 0 6,1 79,4
Kenya 42,8 57,2 16,4 8,7 9,5 6,8 78,3
Malawi 73,1 26,9 44,4 23,6 0 13 44,4
Mali 40,2 59,8 14,8 10,4 0 0,3 99,6
Mauritania 72,6 27,4 23,1 6,1 0 0 100
Senegal 39 61 15,3 10,1 7,4 8,4 90,4
Swaziland 63,1 36,9 1,7 11,4 0 19 41,1
Zimbabwe 35,8 64,2 2 9,8 0 29,2 50,9
So urce : Natio nal Health Acco unts  o f Wo rld Health Organiza tio n, 2002.
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3.2 Data 
The data was obtained from the World Health Survey conducted in 2002–2003, 
which was launched by the World Health Organization.
2
 The World Health Survey is 
cross-sectional and is based on a multi-stage clustered random sample of households 
designed to be nationally representative. The questionnaire is standardized across 
countries.
3
 
The survey collects a range of information on health service utilization, 
expenditures and household socioeconomic indicators. The household questionnaire is 
administered to the household member most knowledgeable about the household. The 
information used from the survey includes socioeconomic information about household 
members such as gender, age, level of education and occupation, as well as households 
assets, health expenditures and behaviors on coping with the latter.
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Particularly, household expenditures were collected for a four-week recall period 
and the sources that are used to pay any health expenditure were collected for a year 
recall period. Such sources include income, savings, payment or reimbursement from a 
health insurance plan, sold items, family members and friends outside the household, 
borrowed from someone else and other. 
The households that benefited from private insurance coverage were excluded 
from the sample analyzed. This exclusion is justified by the fact that the households 
with insurance coverage were in some way protected towards a health shock and in that 
sense in a different process of decision making in terms of how to finance their health 
                                                          
2
 More information can be obtained at http://www.who.int/healthinfo/survey/whsresults/en/index.html 
3
 Questionnaire specific for low-income countries. 
4
 For more details on the Survey Questions, see page 30. 
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expenditures. With this exclusion 2% of the observations were lost, which accounts for 
a total of 1110 households with insurance. Country-wise, the proportion of losses ranges 
from 1% in Kenya Mauritania and Swaziland to 19% in Congo.
5
 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
6
  
On average, 79% of the household heads are male, being the country with the 
highest percentage of male household heads Mali (with 97%) and the country with the 
lowest Zimbabwe (with 69%). The average age of the household head across countries 
is 43 years old, being the country with the highest average age Mali (with 53 years) and 
the lowest Malawi (with 37 years). In terms of education, the percentage of people not 
completing primary school ranges from 24% in Congo to 91% in Mali, while for having 
completed primary and more than secondary school the distribution is similar across 
countries, with an average proportion of 19% and 22%, respectively. 
The average size of the households across countries in the sample is around 6 
members, while Mali has the highest average, around 9 members and Kenya the lowest 
around 4 members. Additionally, in average 37% of the households are located in urban 
area, being Congo the country with a higher percentage of households in the urban areas 
(82%) and Ethiopia with more households located in the rural areas (15%).  
The values of the dependency index range from an average value of 54% in 
Malawi to 5% in Ethiopia, while the percentage of having had hospitalizations range 
from 21% in Mauritania to 4% in Ethiopia. In terms of institutionalization of members 
the values did not differ much across countries, being around 1%. We observe the same 
                                                          
5
 See Table A1, page 31. 
6
 See Table A2, page 31. 
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behavior for the variables long-term care, pregnant women and health worker, with 
average values around 4%. 
In addition, all of these countries were involved in conflicts in the African 
continent and suffered with many civil wars along the years. Particularly in the last 
decade, Chad and Kenya had two civil wars, while Côte d‟Ivoire, Mali and Senegal 
suffered with only one civil conflict, respectively. 
 
3.4 Empirical Methodology 
Since each household can adopt a strategy or a combination of strategies of their 
choice, it is imperative to know the factors that influence not only the choice of each 
one of the three strategies separately but also the possible combinations. In the first 
case, the dependent variables analyzed include strategies that the households choose to 
cope with health expenditures, such as their own resources (income and savings), 
selling assets and borrowing. 
Nevertheless, the existence of a relative importance of using a particular 
strategy is undeniable. Using own resources is less costly for the household than 
selling assets or even to be subject to a particular interest rate when borrowing from 
someone. As we do not have the information about in which proportions the 
households choose to follow each strategy, when combined, the choice of using the 
strategies will be also studied in ordinal terms.  
For this purpose, a variable called penalization is created, capturing the 
financial hardship that households suffer when faced with health expenditures in an 
14 
 
ordinal scale. This variable assumes the value 1 when the household only uses its own 
resources to cope with health expenditure, 2 if the household uses not only the latter 
strategies but also sells their assets and finally 3 if the household uses all strategies 
available (if the household does not have savings or assets is also financial hardship if 
it borrows to cope with health expenditures). With penalization, the goal is to analyze 
which factors influence adoption of a coping strategy that implies a higher 
penalization of resources, an approach not taken in the previous literature. 
 Furthermore, when faced with the strategies that households can use to cope 
with health expenditures the importance of the existence of health expenditures arises. 
The reason is clear, a household without health expenditures does not face any 
constraint in defining which strategy to follow, being the existence of health 
expenditures the start of the process of decision making and the source of financial 
hardship for many households.  
In order to study the factors that influence the existence of health expenditures 
the variable HE1 is built, a binary variable that takes the value 1 when the household 
had in fact any health expenditure and 0 otherwise. 
The latter variable does not take into consideration an important feature when 
analyzing health expenditures in which households incur, its amount.  In consequence, it 
was decided to create the fifth dependent variable studied, HE2 which assumes the 
values of the expenditures stated by the households in the survey.
7
 With HE2 we can 
infer which factors contribute to a greater amount of health expenditures made by the 
households and not only its existence. 
                                                          
7
 The expenditures are in the 13 different currencies. 
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To explain the coping strategies adopted and to identify particular population 
groups associated with larger health expenditures, several factors are considered, 
described in the following table. 
Table 3. Definition of variables: 
 
Variable 
 
Description 
Characteristics of the 
household head: 
 
Male 
A binary variable that scores 1 for male 0 for female 
household head 
Age In years 
Schooling: Divided into three binary variables 
No primary 
A binary variable that scores 1 for the ones who have 
no formal education and 0 for those who have 
Primary 
A binary variable that scores 1 for those who completed 
primary education and 0 otherwise 
Secondary or higher 
A binary variable that scores 1 for those who completed 
secondary or higher education and 0 otherwise 
Size 
Defined in the survey as the number of people living in 
the household 
Household Characteristics:  
Urban 
A binary variable that scores 1 for the households 
localized in an urban area and 0 otherwise 
Hosp 
A binary variable for having had at least one member 
hospitalized in the past year 
Inst 
A binary variable for having any member of the 
household institutionalized 
Longcare 
A binary variable where 1 means that some household 
member needs long-term care and 0 otherwise 
Pregnant 
A binary variable for having at least one household 
member pregnant 
 
Depindex 
A Dependency Index which measures the relation 
between the inactive population (≤5 and ≥60 years old) 
and the total number of household members, ranging 
from 1 to 0, where 1 means that all the household 
population is either under 5 or over 60, and 0 if all 
household members have ages higher than 5 but lower 
than 60 
Hworker 
A binary variable for having at least one member of the 
household working in the health sector 
Asset Index Indicator of a household‟s permanent income, divides 
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the households into quintiles 
Quintiles 
Five quintiles in the form of binary variables that score 
1 if the household belongs to that quintile and 0 
otherwise 
Country dummies 
Thirteen binary variables that score 1 if the household 
belongs to that country and 0 otherwise 
 
Since information about the household‟s income was not given by the survey 
and to allow for further comparisons within countries, an Asset Index was used as 
indicator of a household‟s permanent income. A total of 25 dummies containing the 
assets that the households owns were used. Such index was calculated for each 
household using a weighted index calculated through principal components analysis 
(PCA). PCA is an exploratory multivariate statistical technique for simplifying complex 
datasets. The defining characteristic of PCA is that it assumes that all of the variability 
in an item should be used in the analysis. Given m (different from country to country) 
observations on 25 variables, the goal of PCA is to reduce the dimensionality of the data 
matrix by finding r new variables, where r is less than 25. Termed principal 
components, these new r variables together account for as much of the variance in the 
original 25 variables as possible while remaining mutually uncorrelated and orthogonal. 
Each principal component is a linear combination of the original variables, such that 
researchers often ascribe meaning to what the variables represent. PCA has been applied 
to asset questions in household surveys under the assumption that it is long-run wealth 
or permanent income that is the phenomenon attributable to the linear index of variables 
with the largest amount of information common to all of the variables (Ferguson et al., 
2003). The result of such application of PCA is an asset index for each household 
according to the formula:  
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where    is the scoring factor for the first asset as determined by the procedure, 
    is the i-th household‟s value for the first asset and   and    are the mean and 
standard deviation of the first asset variable over all households. The index was then 
divided into equal quintiles. And five binary variables were constructed scoring 1 if the 
household‟s asset index result is from that particular quintile and 0 otherwise. 
 
3.5 Regression Models 
The regression models used include the regular probit model, an ordered probit 
and a tobit model. For the strategies estimation, firstly, an ordered probit model was 
estimated. The dependent variable is a latent variable illustrating the financial hardship 
imposed by the existence of health expenditures, penalization. This model additionally 
gives us the probability of using one of the strategies described before. 
Secondly, three probit models were estimated separately for the probability of 
using the strategies households have available to cope with health expenditures: own 
resources; selling assets; and borrowing from family and others outside the household.  
For the estimation of expenditures, first, a probit model was estimated for the 
factors that influence the probability of having health expenditures. And finally,  a tobit 
model was estimated to evaluate the linear relationship between variables when there is 
a left-censoring (having expenditures higher than 0) in the dependent variable HE2.  
Despite the analysis of the coefficients signs and significance, to interpret the 
effect of the exogenous factors on the dependent variable the marginal effects will also 
be analyzed. The marginal effects measure the expected instantaneous change in the 
dependent variable as a function of a change in a certain explanatory variable while 
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keeping all the other covariates constant. This analysis is conducted when in the 
presence of a latent dependent variable.  
The models were run separately for each of the thirteen countries using the same 
set of independent variables and together including specific dummies for the countries. 
The reference category for education is no primary, the reference category for 
the asset index is the first quintile and the reference category for the countries dummies 
is country 1 (Burkina Faso).  
 
Section 4. Results 
The models were run first country-by-country and then to the full sample of 
countries. Including in the second case a dummy variable for each country. 
 
4.1 The choice of coping strategies 
Table A3
8
 reports the ordered probit estimated for the penalization index. We 
first report on the country-by-country estimates. 
The factors that influence significantly penalization of household resources 
are: a greater size of the household (for 6 countries) and having hospitalized members 
(for 7 countries) increase the penalization of households‟ resources, while being 
localized in an urban area decreases the penalization (for 8 countries).  
Other factors influence significantly, positive and negatively the penalization 
of resources, but in a smaller number of countries. Factors that also increase 
penalization are increasing age, having members who need long-term care, having 
                                                          
8
 Table A3, page 32. 
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pregnant women in the household, and being in quintile 2. Factors that decrease 
penalization include having a male household head, a greater dependency index and 
being in quintile 3 and 4. The rest of the variables increase significantly the dependent 
variable in some countries and decrease in others. 
By regressing the model with the full sample of countries together (Table A4, 
page 33), allowing for country-specific effects, penalization of resources seem to be 
significantly increased by a higher age of the household head, greater household size, 
having hospitalized and institutionalized members or even members who need long-
term care, as well as having members working in the health sector. On the other hand, 
penalization is significantly decreased by having a household head who completed 
primary and secondary or a higher educational level, by households localized in an 
urban area, by a higher dependency index and  being in the 5
th
 quintile.  Analysing the 
quintiles coefficients, they clearly illustrate the common belief that households at a 
lower quintile are subject to a higher penalization and this effect would decrease across 
quintiles. That is, families at the lowest quintiles have to use penalizing strategies. 
Additionally, living in all countries decreases the penalization of resources 
relatively to living in Burkina Faso, while living in Mali and Mauritania increases it. In 
fact, in moving from Mauritania to Swaziland we assist to a higher ability in coping 
with unexpected expenditures. Looking simultaneously to the GDP per capita level 
present in Table 1., the latter effect is consistent with an increase in the GDP per capita 
level from Mauritania to Swaziland. 
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4.2 Individual strategy choice 
Table A5
9
 reports the results of the estimated probit for the first strategy 
analyzed, use of own resources.  
Having a male household head (for 5 countries) and that completed secondary 
or a higher educational level (for 4 countries) increases the probability of using income 
and savings to cope with health expenditures, as well as having a greater household size 
(for 5 countries) or a household localized in an urban area (for 6 countries). While 
having hospitalized members (for 5 countries) in the household decreases the 
probability of using income and savings. This effect enlighten us about the higher costs 
of hospitalization to the households. 
Table A6
10
 reports the results of the estimated probit for the second strategy, 
selling assets. The vulnerability of the households to the use of this strategy increases 
with a greater household size (for 8 countries) and by having hospitalized members (for 
7 countries), contrary to the precious strategy. Whereas living in an urban area (for 10 
countries) and having a household head who completed secondary or a higher 
educational degree (for 7 countries) decreases the probability of selling assets to cope 
with the existence of health expenditures, which is consistent with the effect found on 
using own resources. 
Table A7
11
 reports the results of the estimated probit for the last strategy, 
borrow from family or others who do not belong to the household. Households exposed 
to the use of this strategy are characterized by a greater age of the household head (for 6 
countries), having hospitalized members (for 9 countries) and female household head 
(for 7 countries). 
                                                          
9
 See Table A5, page 34. 
10
 See Table A6, page 35. 
11
 See Table A7, page 36. 
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Table A8
12
combines the results the probit models for the whole sample, 
including dummies for each country. The vulnerability of families towards using own 
resources, is increased by having a male household head, a household head who 
completed primary and secondary or a higher educational level, by a greater household 
size, by the location of the household being located in an urban area and in the 2
nd
 
quintile.  
Additionally, households with a greater number of members use more the 
strategy of selling assets, as well as the ones having some of them hospitalized and 
institutionalized, members who need long-term care, pregnant women or even members 
who work in the health sector, as being in 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 quintiles. The probability of 
selling assets is on the other side decreased by having a household head who completed 
secondary or a higher degree of education, by a household localized in an urban area, a 
higher dependency index and being in the 5
th
 quintile.  
At last, the overall probability of borrowing to cope with health expenditures 
is decreased by having a male household head, although being increased by its age, the 
size of the household, the dependency index, having hospitalized members and who 
need long-term care, having members working in the health sector and by the household 
belonging to the 3
rd
 quintile. 
 
4.3 Marginal Effects
13
 
In this sense, each set of dependent variables will be analyzed separately. 
Firstly, in terms of household-head characteristics being a male has the higher effect on 
the probability of using own resources, while its age has almost no impact. Secondly, in 
                                                          
12
 See Table A8, page 37. 
13
 See Table A9, page 38. 
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terms of broad household variables, being located in an urban area has a higher effect on 
the probability using own resources, while having some member who needs long-term 
care has the highest negative impact, followed by having an hospitalized member. 
Thirdly, in terms of quintiles distribution being at the first three quintiles has a higher 
impact on the probability of using own resources than being in the last two quintiles. 
Finally, in terms of countries, being in Ethiopia and Ghana increases slightly the 
probability of using own resources to cope with health expenditures, while for the rest 
of the countries the impact is negative and the highest in Zimbabwe. 
In terms of marginal effects of the probability of selling assets to cope with 
health expenditures, in the household-head characteristics having completed secondary 
school or a higher educational level has the highest impact, while once again age has 
almost no effect. At the whole household level, having an hospitalized and 
institutionalizes member have the highest positive impact, a household located in an 
urban area seems to have the highest negative impact the probability of selling assets to 
cope with health expenditures. In terms of quintiles distribution being at the first three 
quintiles has a higher positive impact on the probability of selling assets than being in 
the last two quintiles. In fact, being at the 4
th
 quintile has almost no effect and being at 
the 5
th
 quintile decreases the probability of selling assets to cope with health 
expenditures In terms of countries, while being in Mali and Mauritania slightly  
increases the probability, for the rest of the countries the effect is negative, being the 
highest Ghana. Note that for the probability of using own resources living in Ghana 
actually had a positive impact. 
In the scope of marginal effects on the probability of borrowing from others to 
cope with health expenditures, being a male has the highest negative effect of the 
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household head characteristics. In terms of household variables, having some member 
who works in the health sector has the highest positive impact, followed by having an 
hospitalized member. Analyzing quintiles distribution being at the first four quintiles 
has a positive low effect on the probability of borrowing, being the highest impact of 
quintile 3, while being at the 5
th
 quintile has almost no effect. Living in Mali decreases 
the probability of borrowing to cope with health expenditures, while for the rest of the 
countries the impact although negative is much lower. 
 
4.4 Discussion 
On the one hand, across countries we have a higher financial penalization on 
households with an older household head, illustrating the fact that when the household 
head attains a higher age threshold the household is more exposed to financial hardship. 
This effect can arise due to the fact that when the household head attains a certain age 
threshold, the contributions to the household income diminish, as does the disposable 
income to face health expenditures. A numerous family, as well as having members in a 
fragile health status (either hospitalized, institutionalized or in need for long-term care) 
contributes to the vulnerability of the household and puts them at risk of having to use 
more than their own resources to cope with health expenditures. 
On the other hand, investing in education is proven to be beneficial for the 
probability of having to penalize the household resources, as well as living in an urban 
area, often more capable in terms of infrastructures to answer people‟s needs.  
While for the probability of using own resources, education and being located 
in an urban area have the same effect described before, in what concerns selling assets 
the effect is the opposite. This negative effect enlightens that more educated households 
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tend to find selling assets a less preferable strategy. Living in an urban area makes it 
difficult to sell assets what contradicts the intuition that in the face of a broad market 
selling assets would be a valuable strategy. A possible reason remains in the fact that 
households still have sufficient income and savings and so a lower probability of selling 
assets to cope with health expenditures. Can also be the case that the nature of assets in 
urban and rural areas is different, being easier to sell live stock for instance than a house 
or a car. 
Additionally, having a bigger family indicates a higher probability of selling 
assets as a strategy to cope with health expenditures. A family with more members 
could mean less assets to sell, indicating that the marginal cost of selling an asset is 
lower than in the case of a larger family. 
All in all, borrowing seems to be the more penalizing strategy for the overall 
sample of households. 
 
Section 5. Determinants of Health Expenditure 
Table A10
14
 reports the probit model estimated for the probability of having 
Health Expenditures. In the majority of countries the probability of having health 
expenditures is positively influenced by the household head having a primary (for 6 
countries) and secondary educational level (for 8 countries), the increase in the size of 
the household (all 13 countries), having hospitalized members (for 11 countries), those 
who need long-term care (for 11 countries) and pregnant women (for 6 countries) and 
being in the 3
rd
 (for 7 countries), 4
th
 (for 8 countries) and 5
th
 (for 8 countries) quintiles. 
                                                          
14
 See Table A10, page 39. 
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The overall probability
15
 of having health expenditures is significantly increased 
by all variables, except for age, urban and dependency index. The latter significantly 
decreases the probability of having health expenditures.  
To evaluate the effect and the strength of the coefficients on the probability of 
having health expenditures we use marginal effects
16
, mentioned earlier in this section. 
Firstly, in terms of household head characteristics completing primary and 
secondary or a higher educational degree has the highest impact on the probability 
having health expenditures. Secondly, a higher dependency index, that is, having a 
higher number of dependent members, strongly decreases the probability having health 
expenditures, while having an hospitalized member increases it. Thirdly, along the 
quintiles the impact on the probability of having health expenditures increases. And  
finally, in terms of countries, living in Ghana and Kenya increases the probability of 
having health expenditures, while for the rest of the countries the impact is negative and 
the highest for Ethiopia. 
Table A13
17
  reports the tobit model results. The probability of having health 
expenditures greater than 0
18
 is positively influenced by the household head having a 
primary (for 7 countries) and secondary educational level (for 8 countries), the increase 
in the size of the household (for 13 countries), the household being localized in an urban 
area (for 6 countries), having hospitalized (for 12 countries) and institutionalized 
members (for 9 countries), those who need long-term care (for 8 countries) and being in 
the  4
th
 (for 8 countries) and 5
th
 (for 10 countries) quintiles. 
 
                                                          
15
 See Table A11, page 40. 
16
 See Table A12, page 41. 
17
 See Table A13, page 42. 
18
 The expenditures are in the currency of each country. 
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Section 6. Concluding remarks 
The vulnerability of families was found to be reflected mainly by their size, 
educational level and members in a poor health status. Educational level of the 
household was proven to be a greater drive for incurring in health expenditures. This 
fact illustrates that a more educated household do not spare on the essential in terms of 
health care. Nevertheless, for all strategies households at the lowest quintiles tend 
exploit them while facing health expenditures than people in the highest quintiles.. 
The choice of coping strategies also depends on the ability of households to 
borrow and the availability of assets. The former is linked not only to the financial 
capacity to repay a loan but also to the availability of social capital. The amounts 
needed may also differ from quintile to quintile. This could be a possible explanation to 
why there is no significant difference in the use of these coping strategies between 
lower quintiles in the majority of countries. Another reason is that the set of countries 
includes countries were the population is very poor and in that sense there is no large 
difference between the first quintiles.  
Moreover, while we have searched for patterns in behavior among countries, it 
is also reasonable to believe that the precise mechanisms underlying coping strategies 
are likely to be context-specific both within and across countries. For instance, living in 
Mali was found to increase the vulnerability of a higher penalization of resources and in 
terms of individual strategies it had a positive impact in the probability of selling assets 
at the same time that decreases the probability of borrowing. For the majority of 
countries the effect in any choice of strategy is negative. 
In interpreting the results, it is imperative to recognize the limitations of this 
study. First, in the absence of panel data there is no way to follow household choices 
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across time. In that sense, the study only captures the responses to an health shock in 
2002 and not its consequences till today. Second, information on the amount of its own 
resources each household used, borrowed or the assets sold would be helpful for more 
perceptive analysis of the coping mechanisms used by households to finance health 
care. 
Furthermore, in order to promote progress of the coping strategies these 
countries used for health spending, achieving a simple policy is probably enough to 
prevent the more severe financial consequences caused by lack of health. Creating a 
formal prepayment scheme and risk-pooling mechanisms to protect the more vulnerable 
households characterized by this study. 
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ANNEXES 
Survey Questions 
Section 0100. Sampling Information 
Q104. Setting: 
1. Urban 
2. Peri-urban/semi-urban 
3. Rural 
4. Other 
Section 0400. Household Roster 
C. Household member age 
D. Household member education 
Section 0500. Household Questionnaire 
Q0500. Who is the person who provides the main economic support for the household? 
 
Section 0560. Malaria Prevention: Use of (bed) nets 
Q0563. Can you please tell me how many children aged under 5 years live in this 
household? 
Q0565. Can you please tell me how many women who live in this household are 
currently pregnant? 
Section 0570. Household Care 
 
Q0570. Is there anyone in your house who is in an institution (hospital, after care home, home for the 
aged, hospice etc.) due to their health condition? 
 
Q0571. Is there anyone in your home, a child or adult, who needs care because of a long-term physical or 
mental illness or disability, or is getting old and weak? 
 
Section 0700. Permanent Income Indicators (Lower Income Countries) 
Q0700. Can you please tell me how many rooms there are in your home? 
Q0701. How many chairs are there in your home? 
Q0702. How many tables are there in your home? 
Q0703. How many cars are there in your household? 
Q0704. Does your home have electricity? 
Does anyone in your household have: 
Q0704. A bicycle? 
Q0706. A clock?  
Q0707. A bucket?  
Q0708. A washing machine for clothes? 
Q0709. A washing machine for dishes?  
Q0710. A refrigerator?  
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Q0711. A fixed line telephone? 
Q0712. A mobile / cellular telephone? 
Q0713. A television?  
Q0714. A computer ? 
Section 0800. Household Expenditure 
Q0804. Health care costs, excluding any insurance reimbursements 
Q0815. In the last 12 months, how many times did members of your household go 
to a hospital and stay overnight? 
In the last 12 months, which of the following financial sources did your household use to pay for any 
health expenditures? 
Q0817 Current income of any household members  
Q0818 Savings (e.g. bank account)  
Q0820 Sold items (e.g. furniture, animals, jewellery, furniture)  
Q0821 Family members or friends from outside the household  
Q0822 Borrowed from someone other than a friend or family  
 
Section 0900. Health Occupations 
Q0900. Identification of member of the household who has ever worked or been trained in a Health-
Related field. 
 
Table A1. Insurance 
 
Table A2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
BurkinaChad Congo CdIvoireEthiopia Ghana Kenya Malawi Mali Mauritania Senegal Swaziland Zimbabwe
Insurance 6 0 553 0 4 90 37 1 0 18 13 27 361
Total 4745 4561 2924 3210 4987 3965 4326 5128 4862 3315 3323 2801 3982
% of Total 0 0 19 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 1 9
n= 4739 n= 4573 n= 2371 n= 3119 n= 4983 n= 3875 n= 4322 n= 5127 n= 4862 n= 3297 n= 3310 n= 2774 n= 3621
Household Head Characteristics: mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
Male 0,89 0,31 0,80 0,40 0,79 0,40 0,83 0,37 0,86 0,35 0,74 0,44 0,68 0,47 0,78 0,41 0,97 0,16 0,72 0,45 0,81 0,39 0,75 0,43 0,69 0,46
Age 42,37 16,24 40,59 16,88 40,89 14,46 41,18 15,30 42,31 16,09 43,47 17,47 39,66 17,80 37,18 16,82 53,11 15,96 42,91 17,28 48,78 15,85 42,97 17,00 39,05 18,35
Education:
No primary 0,84 0,36 0,82 0,39 0,24 0,43 0,53 0,50 0,63 0,48 0,50 0,50 0,42 0,49 0,67 0,47 0,91 0,29 0,70 0,46 0,67 0,47 0,44 0,50 0,30 0,46
Primary 0,08 0,27 0,10 0,29 0,29 0,45 0,21 0,40 0,00 0,00 0,35 0,48 0,26 0,44 0,22 0,42 0,05 0,21 0,13 0,34 0,17 0,37 0,24 0,43 0,38 0,48
Secondary or higher 0,08 0,27 0,09 0,28 0,47 0,50 0,27 0,44 0,37 0,48 0,15 0,36 0,31 0,46 0,10 0,31 0,05 0,21 0,17 0,38 0,16 0,37 0,31 0,46 0,33 0,47
Household Characteristics:
Size 5,81 3,14 5,09 2,92 5,06 2,89 5,31 3,36 5,58 2,37 5,21 2,92 4,27 2,54 4,38 2,25 8,91 3,61 5,75 2,80 7,97 3,41 5,56 3,19 4,97 2,40
Urban 0,41 0,49 0,24 0,43 0,82 0,38 0,61 0,49 0,15 0,36 0,39 0,49 0,32 0,47 0,16 0,36 0,25 0,43 0,43 0,50 0,48 0,50 0,24 0,43 0,32 0,47
Dependency Index 0,11 0,19 0,11 0,22 0,13 0,20 0,07 0,18 0,05 0,15 0,09 0,21 0,10 0,23 0,54 0,47 0,17 0,19 0,10 0,19 0,07 0,13 0,06 0,17 0,06 0,16
Hospitalization 0,15 0,35 0,11 0,31 0,15 0,35 0,13 0,34 0,04 0,20 0,21 0,41 0,15 0,35 0,20 0,40 0,08 0,27 0,21 0,41 0,13 0,33 0,08 0,28 0,11 0,31
Institutionalization 0,01 0,08 0,01 0,11 0,01 0,11 0,01 0,08 0,003 0,05 0,01 0,10 0,00 0,06 0,004 0,07 0,01 0,11 0,01 0,09 0,01 0,11 0,01 0,11 0,01 0,09
Long-term care 0,05 0,21 0,04 0,19 0,08 0,28 0,03 0,17 0,04 0,21 0,03 0,16 0,05 0,22 0,03 0,18 0,05 0,22 0,04 0,18 0,10 0,30 0,04 0,20 0,09 0,29
Pregnants 0,04 0,20 0,19 0,20 0,06 0,24 0,02 0,12 0,002 0,04 0,01 0,11 0,02 0,14 0,03 0,17 0,15 0,36 0,04 0,19 0,03 0,16 0,001 0,03 0,09 0,29
Health worker 0,11 0,31 0,01 0,09 0,05 0,21 0,02 0,14 0,01 0,09 0,02 0,15 0,03 0,16 0,02 0,16 0,04 0,19 0,01 0,11 0,04 0,19 0,04 0,20 0,00 0,06
MalawiKenyaGhana ZimbabweSwazilandSenegalMauritaniaMali
Variable
Burkina Faso EthiopiaCôte d'IvoireCongoChad
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Table A3. Ordered probit results for the penalization index: 
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Table A4. Ordered probit results for full sample:  
 
Household Head Characteristics:
Male -0,0337
(SE) (0,0316)
Age -0,0087 **
(SE) (0,0034)
Age
2 0,0001 ***
(SE) (0,0000)
Education:
Primary -0,0567 *
(SE) (0,0320)
Secondary or higher -0,1980 ***
(SE) (0,0322)
Household Characteristics:
Size 0,0336 ***
(SE) (0,0041)
Urban -0,3815 ***
(SE) (0,0271)
Dependency Index -0,2296 ***
(SE) (0,0776)
Hospitalization 0,2917
(SE) (0,0277)
Institutionalization 0,2214 **
(SE) (0,1013)
Long-term care 0,2169 ***
(SE) (0,0475)
Pregnants 0,0539
(SE) (0,0614)
Health worker 0,6934 ***
(SE) (0,0559)
Income quintile
2 0,0217
(SE) (0,0363)
3 -0,0153
(SE) (0,0364)
4 -0,0317
(SE) (0,0366)
5 -0,1246 ***
(SE) (0,0380)
Countries:
Chad -0,4537 ***
(SE) (0,0493)
Congo -1,0778 ***
(SE) (0,0693)
Côte d'Ivoire -1,2377 ***
(SE) (0,0581)
Ethiopia -0,7564 ***
(SE) (0,0453)
Ghana -1,3937 ***
(SE) (0,0455)
Kenya -0,8002 ***
(SE) (0,0434)
Malawi -0,9728 ***
(SE) (0,0443)
Mali 1,7992 ***
(SE) (0,1364)
Mauritania 0,5068 ***
(SE) (0,0446)
Senegal -1,1813 ***
(SE) (0,0533)
Swaziland -1,2219 ***
(SE) (0,0665)
Zimbabwe -0,4610 ***
(SE) (0,0634)
*P<0.10, **P<0.05,***P<0.01, SE, standard error
Full SamplePenalization
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Table A5. Probit results for own resources strategy:  
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Table A6. Probit results for selling assets strategy:  
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Table A7. Probit results for the borrowing strategy:  
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Table A8. Probit results for the full sample by coping strategy:  
 
Household Head Characteristics:
Male 0,1931 *** -0,0417 -0,2614 ***
(SE) (0,0238) (0,0255) (0,024)
Age 0,0012 0,0029 -0,0181 ***
(SE) (0,0025) (0,0026) (0,003)
Age
2 0,0000 * 0,0000 0,0002 ***
(SE) (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,000)
Education:
Primary 0,0496 ** -0,0331 0,0166
(SE) (0,0240) (0,0255) (0,025)
Secondary or higher 0,1619 *** -0,2262 *** -0,0279
(SE) (0,0254) (0,0267) (0,026)
Household Characteristics:
Size 0,0235 *** 0,0324 *** 0,0056 *
(SE) (0,0003) (0,0032) (0,003)
Urban 0,1780 *** -0,3655 *** 0,0148
(SE) (0,0203) (0,0214) (0,0214)
Dependency Index 0,0296 -0,1206 ** 0,1130 *
(SE) (0,0541) (0,0576) (0,0581)
Hospitalization -0,0808 *** 0,1751 *** 0,3536 ***
(SE) (0,0218) (0,0223) (0,0222)
Institutionalization 0,0248 0,1695 ** 0,0299
(SE) (0,0772) (0,0783) (0,0814)
Long-term care -0,1448 *** 0,0881 ** 0,2230 ***
(SE) (0,0349) (0,0362) (0,0361)
Pregnants 0,1020 ** 0,1210 *** 0,0322
(SE) (0,0430) (0,0430) (0,0502)
Health worker -0,0422 0,1054 ** 0,6942 ***
(SE) (0,0445) (0,0457) (0,0429)
Income quintile
2 0,0512 * 0,0688 ** 0,0421
(SE) (0,0299) (0,0306) (0,0307)
3 0,0458 0,0602 ** 0,0955 ***
(SE) (0,0297) (0,0305) (0,0304)
4 0,0134 0,0144 0,0468
(SE) (0,0293) (0,0304) (0,0303)
5 0,0130 -0,0619 ** 0,0179
(SE) (0,0298) (0,0313) (0,0309)
Countries:
Chad -1,0046 *** -0,3846 *** -0,4288 ***
(SE) (0,0417) (0,0395) (0,0439)
Congo -0,6912 *** -0,8425 *** -0,3428 ***
(SE) (0,0435) (0,0451) (0,0446)
Côte d'Ivoire -0,7324 *** -1,0657 *** -0,0915 *
(SE) (0,0474) (0,0557) (0,0467)
Ethiopia 0,6796 *** -0,5270 *** -0,4923 ***
(SE) (0,0646) (0,0442) (0,0498)
Ghana 0,0845 ** -1,2852 *** -0,1929 ***
(SE) (0,0419) (0,0420) (0,0375)
Kenya -0,2288 *** -0,6031 *** -0,1229 ***
(SE) (0,0413) (0,0384) (0,0386)
Malawi -0,5005 *** -0,5367 *** -0,3360 ***
(SE) (0,0401) (0,0373) (0,0396)
Mali -0,8689 *** 0,0256 -1,2168 ***
(SE) (0,0455) (0,0429) (0,0583)
Mauritania -0,4777 *** 0,6256 *** -0,8467 ***
(SE) (0,0478) (0,0447) (0,0562)
Senegal -0,5642 *** -1,1505 *** -0,0985 **
(SE) (0,0436) (0,0465) (0,0420)
Swaziland -0,7815 *** -1,0569 *** -0,2930 ***
(SE) (0,0476) (0,0523) (0,0493)
Zimbabwe -1,1497 *** -0,0520 -0,2329 ***
(SE) (0,0476) (0,0455) (0,0484)
*P<0.10, **P<0.05,***P<0.01, SE, standard error
Full Sample Own Resources Sell Borrow
38 
 
Table A9. Marginal Effects by coping strategy:  
 
Household Head Characteristics:
Male 0,0664 -0,0137 -0,0757
(SE) (0,0084) (0,0085) (0,007)
Age 0,0004 0,0009 -0,0049
(SE) (0,0008) (0,0009) (0,001)
Age
2 0,0000 0,0000 0,0001
(SE) (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,000)
Education:
Primary 0,0163 -0,0107 0,0045
(SE) (0,0078) (0,0082) (0,007)
Secondary or higher 0,0523 -0,0706 -0,0075
(SE) (0,0080) (0,0079) (0,007)
Household Characteristics:
Size 0,0078 0,0106 0,0015
(SE) (0,0010) (0,0010) (0,001)
Urban 0,0583 -0,1153 0,0040
(SE) (0,0066) (0,0065) (0,0058)
Dependency Index 0,0099 -0,0394 0,0306
(SE) (0,0180) (0,0188) (0,0157)
Hospitalization -0,0273 0,0590 0,1046
(SE) (0,0075) (0,0077) (0,0071)
Institutionalization 0,0082 0,0581 0,0082
(SE) (0,0253) (0,0280) (0,0226)
Long-term care -0,0499 0,0294 0,0655
(SE) (0,1241) (0,0124) (0,0114)
Pregnants 0,0329 0,0408 0,0088
(SE) (0,0135) (0,0150) (0,0140)
Health worker -0,0142 0,0354 0,2336
(SE) (0,0152) (0,0158) (0,0165)
Income quintile
2 0,0168 0,0228 0,0115
(SE) (0,0097) (0,0103) (0,0085)
3 0,0151 0,0199 0,0266
(SE) (0,0097) (0,0102) (0,0087)
4 0,0045 0,0047 0,0128
(SE) (0,0097) (0,0100) (0,0084)
5 0,0043 -0,0200 0,0049
(SE) (0,0099) (0,0100) (0,0085)
Countries:
Chad -0,3792 -0,1113 -0,0974
(SE) (0,0155) (0,0099) (0,0081)
Congo -0,2587 -0,2040 -0,0806
(SE) (0,0171) (0,0073) (0,0089)
Côte d'Ivoire -0,2756 -0,2319 -0,0239
(SE) (0,0186) (0,0066) (0,0118)
Ethiopia 0,1797 -0,1441 -0,1078
(SE) (0,0123) (0,0097) (0,0084)
Ghana 0,0275 -0,2763 -0,0488
(SE) (0,0134) (0,0051) (0,0088)
Kenya -0,0799 -0,1641 -0,0319
(SE) (0,0150) (0,0083) (0,0096)
Malawi -0,1825 -0,1490 -0,0802
(SE) (0,0155) (0,0085) (0,0082)
Mali -0,3263 0,0084 -0,1986
(SE) (0,0175) (0,0142) (0,0047)
Mauritania -0,1753 0,2313 -0,1550
(SE) (0,0187) (0,0177) (0,0060)
Senegal -0,2085 -0,2460 -0,0257
(SE) (0,0171) (0,0054) (0,0105)
Swaziland -0,2951 -0,2297 -0,0701
(SE) (0,0186) (0,0063) (0,0102)
Zimbabwe 0,4332 -0,0167 -0,0572
(SE) (0,0168) (0,0144) (0,0107)
SE, standard error
Marginal Effects Own Resources Sell Borrow
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Table A10. Probit results for the HE1: 
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Table A11. Probit results for the full sample:  
Household Head Characteristics:
Male 0,0348 **
(SE) (0,0155)
Age -0,0005
(SE) (0,0009)
Age
2 0,0000
(SE) (0,0000)
Education:
Primary 0,1054 ***
(SE) (0,0173)
Secondary or higher 0,1131 ***
(SE) (0,0170)
Household Characteristics:
Size 0,0474 ***
(SE) (0,0021)
Urban 0,0180
(SE) (0,0139)
Dependency Index -0,2688 **
(SE) (0,0276)
Hospitalization 0,5789 ***
(SE) (0,0183)
Institutionalization 0,3826 ***
(SE) (0,0702)
Long-term care 0,3276 ***
(SE) (0,0279)
Pregnants 0,1941 ***
(SE) (0,0320)
Health worker 0,1211 ***
(SE) (0,0332)
Income quintile
2 0,0568 ***
(SE) (0,0191)
3 0,1485 ***
(SE) (0,0193)
4 0,2375 ***
(SE) (0,0195)
5 0,2972 ***
(SE) (0,0201)
Countries:
Chad -0,3801 ***
(SE) (0,0272)
Congo -0,0543 *
(SE) (0,0303)
Côte d'Ivoire -0,0235
(SE) (0,0339)
Ethiopia -0,6797 ***
(SE) (0,0277)
Ghana 0,6422 ***
(SE) (0,0308)
Kenya 0,2277 ***
(SE) (0,0285)
Malawi -0,0149
(SE) (0,0294)
Mali -0,1581 ***
(SE) (0,0300)
Mauritania -0,5506 ***
(SE) (0,0297)
Senegal -0,2006 ***
(SE) (0,0299)
Swaziland -0,3139 ***
(SE) (0,0316)
Zimbabwe -0,5870 ***
(SE) (0,0302)
*P<0.10, **P<0.05,***P<0.01, SE, standard error
Full SampleHE1
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Table A12. Marginal effects on HE1: 
  
Household Head Characteristics:
Male 0,0139
(SE) (0,0062)
Age -0,0002
(SE) (0,0004)
Age
2 0,0000
(SE) (0,0000)
Education:
Primary 0,0419
(SE) (0,0068)
Secondary or higher 0,0450
(SE) (0,0067)
Household Characteristics:
Size 0,0189
(SE) (0,0008)
Urban 0,0072
(SE) (0,0056)
Dependency Index -0,1071
(SE) (0,0110)
Hospitalization 0,2209
(SE) (0,0065)
Institutionalization 0,1479
(SE) (0,0257)
Long-term care 0,1279
(SE) (0,0105)
Pregnants 0,0767
(SE) (0,0124)
Health worker 0,0481
(SE) (0,0131)
Income quintile
2 0,0226
(SE) (0,0076)
3 0,0590
(SE) (0,0076)
4 0,0939
(SE) (0,0076)
5 0,1171
(SE) (0,0078)
Countries:
Chad 0,1497
(SE) (0,0104)
Congo -0,0217
(SE) (0,0121)
Côte d'Ivoire -0,0094
(SE) (0,0135)
Ethiopia -0,2590
(SE) (0,0095)
Ghana 0,2404
(SE) (0,0102)
Kenya 0,0898
(SE) (0,0111)
Malawi -0,0059
(SE) (0,0117)
Mali -0,0620
(SE) (0,0119)
Mauritania -0,2126
(SE) (0,0107)
Senegal -0,0798
(SE) (0,0118)
Swaziland -0,1241
(SE) (0,0122)
Zimbabwe -0,2258
(SE) (0,0107)
SE, standard error
Marginal EffectsHE1
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Table A13. Tobit results for HE2: 
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